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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
does not involve a consideration of the principles of contracts at all."2 3

The term quasi contract or contract implied in law denotes the source
of obligation. "It is a term used to cover a class of obligations where
the law, though the defendant did not intend to assume an obligation,
imposes an obligation upon him, notwithstanding the absence of in24
tention on his part, and in many cases in spite of his actual dissent."
One source on which quasi contracts arise is upon the doctrine that
no one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of
another. 25 This doctrine gives the most numerous illustrations of the
scope of quasi contract, and it always involves not the question of the
defendant's intention, but what in equity and good conscience the defendant ought to do. Quasi contractual obligations are based upon
equitable considerations, but are enforced by legal remedies because
their origin was in the courts of law. Invoking the doctrines of equity
and abandoning the rules of implied contracts was the real reason for
allowing the surgeons to recover in the Agnew case.
Anthony W. Brick, Jr.

RECENT DECISIONS
NEGLiGENcE-NAURAL

AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES-CONSEQUENCES

SHOULD HAVE BEEN FoRxsE-N.-In Pure Distributing Corporation v.

THAT

Carey, 97

S. W. (2d) 768 (1936), decided in the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, one H. S.
Johnson was employed by the Pure Distributing Corporation, and, while driving
a company truck along a gravel road, at a fast rate of speed, one of the cans of
distillate, which made up the load, fell to the ground. The can exploded, causing
the lid to fly some twenty or thirty feet through the air, and struck one Walter
Carey who was lying on a cot, close to his trailer house, thereby causing a severe
wound in his head. Carey was invisible from the road because of bushes which
screened his presence. Carey's wife, inside of the trailer, heard the commotion
and saw something fly through the air. She concluded an attack was being made
upon her husband, because of his outcry, and she jumped up from bed to secure
a pistol and stumbled to the door where she saw blood flowing from her husband's head. As a result, she suffered a miscarriage. Walter Carey brought his suit
against the corporation to recover the sum of $11,000 for injuries sustained by
himself and wife. The jury in the trial case, upon the admission of the truck
driver that he knew of defective fasteners which held the side of the truck, found
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries to both Carey and
his wife, and awarded $1,500 to Carey and $2,000 to his wife. The Corporation
then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which reversed the lower court on
28
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the grounds that Johnson, the truck driver, could not reasonably anticipate, in
the ordinary course of human experience, that such consequences would result
from his negligence, and further that there was no legal or moral obligation to
guard against that which could not be foreseen. The court further held that the
evidence failed to support the jury's finding that the truck driver's negligence was
the proximate cause. The judgment was accordingly reversed.
On motion for rehearing, which was denied, Justice Bobbit filed a dissenting
opinion wherein he maintained that the Careys should have been successful. His
opinion is based on the additional facts that the road on which the truck was
moving at the time of the accident was a well-traveled one to a resort, and that
Johnson knew or should have known that there were travelers camped in the
locality where the Careys were located that night. It is further set forth that
since the defendant Johnson also knew of the defective, "dangerous" condition
of the truck, as it was being operated, he might reasonably have foreseen some
injury to the persons along the road as a result of a falling oil can and explosion,
especially since it contained a highly volatile substance. Justice Bobbit maintains
that the rule of foreseeability, which the majority of the court applied, is not
the true rule in Texas; that the specific consequences need not be foreseeable to
impose liability on the negligent defendant if a general injury to persons similarly
located might reasonably be expected by him; also, that the injuries sustained
were the direct, natural and probable result of defendant's confessed negligence
and reckless conduct; that the causal connection between the negligent act which
caused the can to fall and explode, and the injuries sustained by the Careys, was
completely within an unbroken chain of events arising as the direct and natural
result of such act of negligence; therefore, because the defendant knew the truck
to be too dangerously defective to be driven along a highway where people
might be, and that other people were or had the right to be camped along the
roadside, and that if, as had happened before, the defective fastener might come
loose causing a can to fall from the truck, it would in some manner inflict serious
injuries to such people along the road, then the actual injuries sustained were
foreseeable within the meaning of the Texas rule, and defendant's negligence
would and should be held to be the proximate cause of the accident; finally, that
under any view the question of forseeability and proximate cause is one of fact
for a jury, and that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the jury's
finding in the lower court.
There are two general rules in regard to the existence of negligence, and both
are expressed in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99
(1928). The majority opinion therein, speaking through Chief Justice Cardozo,
points out that "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed,
and risk imparts relation; it is a risk to another or others within the range of
apprehension." And further, "'In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the
individual complaining, the observance of which would have averted or avoided
the injury.'" It appears, therefore, that the majority opinion handled the case
as concerning the question-of whether defendant owed a duty to the specific
plaintiff, and whether such duty comprehended a risk of the kind involved, as
applied to the case in point. The problem would be whether the defendant in his
position and with the knowledge he had of the defective fasteners on the sides
of the truck, and also coupled with the knowledge that people often camped in
the area wherein defendant was encamped for the night, created such a duty
toward such persons from him as to render him liable for the injuries which resulted from his negligent act. Justice Andrews, in the minority -opinion, assumed
that there was such a duty owing and disregarded the same, basing his reasoning
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more on the theory that proximate cause was the important question, and where
there was a causal connection between the negligent act axid the resulting injury,
liability should ensue.
In short, the two theories laid down were: That if the hazard was not apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, it was not reasonably foreseeable and
there should be no liability; and That where there is a negligent act which might
result in injury, and the resulting injury is the direct and natural result of the act,
there is a causal connection and the act must be regarded as the proximate cause
of the injury. See Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 CoL. L. REv. 789, 791.
The difference between the two views may be summed up in another manner
also, as expressed by Arthur L. Goodhart. He summarizes the differences as follows: "According to the former [Cordozo, C. J.] negligence is a relation between
particular individuals. It is not a wrong to third persons, and therefore they
cannot recover even though they may have been injured by the act. According
to the latter [Andrews, J.], negligence is not only a wrong to the particular individual foreseeably endangered by the act, but also, to anyone who may be injured by it." Goodhart, The Forseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 Y,=a
L. J. 449, 452.
It would appear, then, that the Texas Court of Civil Appeals also came to
disagreement concerning these views. The majority opinion evidently relied on
the fact that not only was the injury unforeseeable but it was also in no sense
foreseeable in regard to any particular person or persons. Whereas Justice Bobbitt
takes the view that Andrews, J., did in the Palsgraf case, namely, that there was
no necessity that a duty be owed to anyone in particular as long as some class
of persons, or someone, might be injured as a result of driving this "dangerous"
and defective vehicle. He believes, as did Andrews, J., that the particular injury
need not be foreseeable, as long as there was causation or causal connection between the negligent act and the resulting injury, and there might reasonably have
been foreseen some injury resulting or probably resulting.
In attempting to discern the Texas rule in regard to causation, and also foreseeability of injuries from negligent acts, the courts seem to have based their
decisions chiefly upon the individual factual situations surrounding each case.
However, as may be seen from the following cases, the general Texas doctrine
on these problems seems to be that the negligent act must be the proximate cause
of the resulting injury, and that some possible or probable injury must have been
foreseeable before recovery will be allowed. "The proximate cause of an event is
that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces the event, and without which the event would not have
occurred." E_ Paso & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 108 S. W. 988, 992 (Tex. Civ. App.
1908). See, also, Kirby Lumber Co. v. Cunningham, 154 S. W. 288, 293, 294 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1913).
However, these cases as well as many others expressly and implicity indicate
that the particular or specific injury resulting need not be foreseeable. Citizens'
Ry. Co. v. Farley, 136 S. W. 94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Wiley v. Atchison, T.
& S. F. Ry. Co., 103 Tex. 336, 127 S. W. 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910). Furthermore,
if an act or omission is one which by ordinary care should have been anticipated
as likely to result in injury to others, as natural and probable consequence, the
actor is liable for injury proximately resulting therefrom, although he did not
foresee that which did happen. Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. McHale, 47 Tex.
Civ. App. 360, 105 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1907); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas
v. Morgan, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 212, 108 S. W. 724, 725, 726 (1908). Again in 1912
it was expressly stated in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. C&. v. Smith, 148 S. W. 820, 822
(Tex. Civ. App. 1912), that "The proximate and natural consequences of an act
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of negligence are always deemed foreseen, though the precise injury may not have
been anticipated." It may be gathered, then, that although Texas requires that the
negligent act must be the proximate cause of the injury and connected by an unbroken chain of events, yet the actor need not foresee the particular or specific
injury resulting.
It seems rather clear, then, from these decisions, that Walter Carey could recover. In regard to his wife, however, the case is somewhat different. Not only
was the injury to her more remote, but also, the court seems to have completely
ignored the question of "recovery for fright." The time of miscarriage is not
mentioned in the report of the case, so the proximity of the same to the other
events in the case remains unknown. However, in the case of St. LoUis, Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Murdock, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 249 116 S. W. 139
(1909), it was held that where a physical injury results from fright or mental
shock caused by negligence, though there be no actual rupture or change in the
substance of any organ or part of the body, a recovery may be had if the negligent act was the proximate cause of the injury. Therefore, it would seem that
once the injury of the woman was attributed to the negligent act of the defendant,
as the proximate cause, she too would and should recover.
At first blush, it would appear that to allow recovery would be stretching the
doctrine of causation to an extremely remote degree. But upon close analysis of
the complete facts of the case, combined with the general Texas authority available, the reasonableness of the minority opinion becomes more apparent.
To advocate the doctrine of liability on the negligent actor for all results
which flow in an unbroken chain, without intervention, would open the door to
unreasonable and unjust litigation. There must be some limit, therefore, to the
remoteness of the injury complained of to the negligent act. This the law has
provided for under the doctrine of public policy. Public policy would not, in my
opinion, interfere with recovery in the principal case.
In the light of the cases mentioned herein, as well as the arguments so ably
presented by Justice Bobbitt, it seems that the only logical and just view was
expressea in the minority opinion. Was there not an injury resulting from a
negligent act of the defendant? And would justice not be brushed aside in a
denial of compensation for the injuries sustained by these plaintiffs as a direct
result of such negligent act? That the defendant could foresee some possible injury cannot be denied, and certainly no great hardship is forced upon him to
recompense those who were actually injured by his negligence. The great weight
of authority in Texas, which has always been liberal, seems to affirm this right
of recovery and to be properly expressed in the dissenting opinion of the principal case. It not only brings forth the law on the point, but also the justice of
allowing recovery for the injury done. When these two-justice and the laware combined, the natural result must be the proper result.
Guy H. McMichael, Jr.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER- ONA FIee PURCHASE s-EVIDNcE AS TO PURCHASE
3N GOOD FATH-WEIn-r AND SuMcIENCY.-A recent New York case, Hood v.

Webster, 271 N. Y. 57, 2 N. E. (2d) 43 (1936), presents a question not altogether
without difficulty, and in respect to which the authorities are not wholly in agreement. The grantee of a deed which had been held in escrow, and was not recorded,
brought an action to annul a subsequent deed to the defendants. The subsequent
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deed expressed the grantees' payment of "One dollar and other good and valuable
consideration," and was duly recorded. Under the defense of purchase in good
faith and for value, the court was called upon to decide who had the burden of
maintaining the affirmative of the issue, and, in a primary sense, the burden of
proof. Section 291 of the Real Property Law of New York (CoNsoL. LAWS, c.
50) provides that every conveyance of real property not recorded "is void as
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration,
from the same vendor, his heirs or devisees, of the same real property or any
portion thereof, whose conveyance is first duly recorded." Held, that the defendants were bound to make out by a fair preponderance of the evidence the
affirmative assertion of their status as purchasers in good faith and for a valuable consideration, and that they had failed to discharge that burden; also, that
the recital in the subsequent deed, which expressed the grantee's payment of "One
dollar and other good and valuable consideration," was insufficient to constitute
them purchasers for a valuable consideration. The majority opinion did say,
however, that the party claiming under an unrecorded conveyance was required
to prove that the subsequent purchaser of record took with notice, when substantial value had been paid for the subsequent conveyance. That fact is more
than evidence of consideration. It is further the basis for the auxilliary inference
that there was, also, good faith in the transaction. For the same reason, the
burden of proof in the primary sense is upon the holder of an unrecorded conveyance when a subsequent deed first recorded acknowledges receipt by the
grantor of a consideration sufficient to satisfy the statute. Wood v. Chapin, 13
N. Y. 509 (1855); Page v. Waring, 76 N. Y. 463 (1879); Lacustrine Fertilizer
Co. v. Lake Guano & Fertilizer Co., 82 N. Y. 476 (1880). Crane, C. J., dissented,
contending that the burden of proof should rest on the person who asserts the
invalidity of the subsequent deed. It is conceded that the holder of a prior unrecorded deed has the burden of proving lack of good faith in the holder of a
subsequent deed. The burden is upon him to prove notice or such circumstances
as would give notice to a reasonable man. Browm v. Volkening, 64 N. Y. 76
(1877); Constant v. University of .Rochester, 133 N. Y. 640 (1892). This rule is
only complicated by shifting the burden of proof when it comes to valuable consideration, and we should not impair the force and efficacy of the recording
statutes upon which it has become a habit and custom to rely in the transfer of
real property.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in the case of Shotweil v. Harrison, 22 Mich.
410 (1871), considered this question and drew a distinction between the burden
of proof as to notice of the prior unrecorded deed, and the burden of proof as
to showing affirmatively the payment of a valuable consideration. The court held
that the burden of proof is upon him who claims by virtue of priority of record
to show affirmatively the payment of a valuable consideration, but that the burden
is upon him claiming under a deed of prior date but of subsequent record to
show that such purchaser under the deed having priority of record had notice
of the prior unrecorded deed. This ruling is founded upon the notion that the
payment of the purchase price being peculiarly within the knowledge of the
grantee under the deed having priority of record, the law would not impose the
burden of proving the negative fact upon the opposite party. This Michigan case
contains a strong dissent by Campbell, C. J., to the effect that there is no ground
for any such distinction, and that the burden rests upon the party claiming under
the unrecorded deed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin concurred with the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Campbell in the case of Hoyle v. Jones, 31 Wis.
389 (1872). The court refused to recognize any distinction between the burden
of proof as to bona fides and valuable consideration, and held that the burden
of proving both should rest on the grantee under the unrecorded deed. The

